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THE POTENTIAL FOR STATE LABOR LAW: THE 
NEW YORK GREENGROCER CODE OF CONDUCT 
Matthew T. Bodie∗ 
Recent labor law scholarship has acknowledged the “ossification” 
of federal labor law.1 The decline in private sector unionism, coupled 
with the relatively stagnant body of law surrounding the National Labor 
Relations Act2 (NLRA), has led to a feeling in the field that there is little 
new under the collective-bargaining sun. Certainly, the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) has made important changes over the last 
decade, such as the recognition of graduate students as “employees” for 
NLRA purposes.3 However, so much has remained the same—and 
seems likely to remain for the foreseeable future—that labor law 
academics often seem gloomy for their discipline’s prospects.4 
One outgrowth of this stagnation has been the increasing 
importance of employment law. In rough terms, labor law governs the 
collective-bargaining relationships between employers and the 
 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. A.B., 1991, Princeton University; 
J.D., 1996, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Peter Spiro and the members of the New 
York University Lawyering Summer Workshop Group—David Zaring, Kerry Abrams, Doni 
Gewirtzman, Babe Howell, Renee Hutchins, Juliet Stumpf, and Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff—for 
their comments and support. Thanks to Si Aydiner for his timely and informative research. This 
essay was inspired in part by Alan Hyde’s remarks at the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law 
Journal’s Twentieth Anniversary Symposium. 
 1. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1527 (2002). 
 2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2000). 
 3. See New York University, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (October 31, 2000). This precedent may 
soon be cut back or even reversed by the new Board. See Steven Greenhouse, Yale’s Labor 
Troubles Deepen as Thousands Go on Strike, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 2003, at B1 (“In a case 
involving New York University, the National Labor Relations Board ruled 28 months ago that 
graduate teaching students at private universities are employees, but the board is reconsidering that 
in cases involving Columbia and Brown.”). For further discussion of this issue, see Grant M. 
Hayden, “The University Works Because We Do”: Collective Bargaining Rights for Graduate 
Assistants, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1223 (2001). 
 4. See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for 
Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59 (1993); cf. Alan Hyde, Employment Law After the 
Death of Employment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 100–03 (1998) (discussing the decline of 
collective bargaining and the legal academy’s failure to grapple with it). 
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representatives of their employees. The field revolves around the NLRA 
and its enforcing agency, the NLRB.5 Employment law, on the other 
hand, describes those statutes, regulations, or common law doctrines 
which cover employees individually. Statutes constitute the bulk of 
employment law, and the range of such statutes is vast. Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act,6 ERISA,7 and the Fair Labor Standards Act8 represent 
a few of the more important federal statutes, while a myriad of state 
statutes further supplement the federal programs or add new protections. 
Many of these statutes were passed in part due to strong support from 
unions.9 Some have argued, however, that these successes in turn 
reduced the importance of unions to workers.10 Regardless of the causes, 
the number of private-sector employees with union representation has 
dwindled from over a third of the nation’s workers to below ten 
percent.11 As a result, the importance of employment law has only 
increased, and the aspects of the employment relationship covered by 
such individually-oriented provisions have continued to climb.12 
Labor scholars have certainly not felt that labor law doctrine is 
perfectly adapted to the current environment. Ever since the number of 
union workers began to decline in the early 1970s, labor law 
commentators have proposed a veritable avalanche of reforms to the 
NLRA.13 While some efforts were made to reform the Act, particularly 
 
 5. 29 C.F.R. §§ 101–103 (2003). 
 6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000). 
 7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2000). 
 8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2000). 
 9. See generally MICHAEL HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIAL, & PROBLEMS 
25 (5th ed. 2003); Michael H. Gottesman, Union Summer: A Reawakened Interest in the Law of 
Labor?, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 287–88. 
 10. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension 
Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 575, 591–93 (1992) (arguing that state legislative and judicial protections for 
employees have served to replace the New Deal collective bargaining regime). 
 11. In 2002, the percentage of private sector workers who were represented by unions fell to 
8.5 percent. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members Summary (Feb. 25, 2003), at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2003); cf. LEO TROY & NEIL 
SHEFLIN, UNION SOURCEBOOK: MEMBERSHIP, STRUCTURE, FINANCE, DIRECTORY app. A at A-1 
(1985) (stating that 35.7 percent of employees in 1953 were represented by unions). 
 12. For recent examples see Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 300gg–300gg-92 (2000) (requiring inter alia that all group health plans limit their period 
of excluded coverage for preexisting conditions to no more than twelve months); Family and 
Medical Leave Act of 1993, 5 U.S.C §§ 6381–6387; 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000) (requiring 
employers to grant unpaid leave to employees for serious illness or care for a newborn or sick 
relative). 
 13. Two of the most prominent, most recent, and most comprehensive efforts are WILLIAM B. 
GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 
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during the late 1970s, ultimately nothing of significance was changed.14 
Some advocates and academic commentators have argued that the lack 
of dynamism has contributed to the ongoing decline in union 
membership.15 Certainly, the reverse might also be true—the erosion of 
union political power has made pro-union legislative reform less likely.16 
Whatever the cause and effect might be, the aforementioned 
“ossification” has frustrated attempts to bring the kind of initiative and 
creativity to labor law that the field of employment law has enjoyed. 
Given the suspended animation of federal labor law, one might 
expect that reformers would turn to state and local governments to bring 
their reforms to life. But states have been stifled by a burgeoning federal 
preemption doctrine, which relegates states and localities to the 
sidelines.17 States are permitted to favor collective bargaining when 
acting as market participants, but they may not use their market power to 
“regulate” the relationship between labor and management.18 They 
cannot penalize activities which are lawful, or even not unlawful under 
the NLRA, nor can they impose additional penalties against illegal 
activities.19 The NLRA’s assumption of the field has left states with little 
else to regulate, at least from a traditional labor law viewpoint. 
However, a development involving some of New York City’s 
lowest paid workers may pave the way for a new approach to state labor 
law. In 2002, the New York State Attorney General, in an effort to 
improve working conditions for employees in New York City’s 
greengrocer establishments,20 developed a Greengrocer Code of 
Conduct.21 The Code sets forth minimum terms and conditions of 
 
(1993), and PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990). For a detailed account of some of the criticism and reforms proposed 
concerning the NLRA, see Estlund, supra note 1, at 1532–44. 
 14. See Estlund, supra note 1, at 1535, 1543–44. 
 15. See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 13, at 105–33; Julius G. Getman, Explaining the Fall of the 
Labor Movement, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 575, 578–84 (1997). 
 16. See Estlund, supra note 1, at 1540, 1543–44. 
 17. See id. at 1569–79. 
 18. See id. at 1573–74. 
 19. See id. at 1571–73. 
 20. Greengrocers are small grocery stores that sell basic food and home supplies. They have a 
smaller selection than supermarkets, but are open later and are more numerous. Unlike convenience 
stores, they offer fresh produce. In a press release about the greengrocer agreement, the New York 
Attorney General’s office noted that greengrocers are primarily owned by Korean immigrants, and 
usually employ between five and fifteen workers, who are generally Mexican immigrants. See Press 
Release, Office of the New York State Attorney General, Landmark Code Of Conduct To Improve 
Working Conditions in the Greengrocer Industry (September 17, 2002), at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/sep/sep17a_02.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2003). 
 21. See Greengrocer Code of Conduct (2002) at 
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employment for employees, including minimum wages, overtime 
requirements, sick and vacation days, and days of rest.22 The Code 
requires that greengrocers attend a state labor law seminar, put up a 
poster about the Code, maintain payroll records, and allow the Attorney 
General’s office immediate access to those records.23 If a greengrocer 
agreed to the Code by December 31, 2002, the state promised to refrain 
from investigating past violations of state employment laws.24 In 
addition, greengrocers abiding by the Code would be provided with a 
Code of Conduct seal to display in their store.25 
The Greengrocer Code of Conduct could be considered a creative 
settlement for violations of a state’s employment law. But the Code is 
more than just a settlement agreement. It is a set of terms and conditions 
of employment that apply to a specific group of workers. It is an off-the-
rack collective bargaining agreement that provides a state seal of 
approval. It is, perhaps, a new model for state involvement in the 
collective bargaining process—in other words, a new approach for state 
labor law. 
This paper will discuss the details and the ramifications of the 
Greengrocer Code of Conduct. Part I will consider the current landscape 
of state labor and employment law and will discuss the barriers to state 
labor law, focusing on preemption. Part II will discuss the Greengrocer 
Code in greater depth. Finally, Part III will discuss how the Code 
provides a new framework for state labor law activity. 
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF STATE LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, labels such as “labor 
law” and “employment law” did not bear their current doctrinal 
significance. The employment relationship was subject to state common 
law, particularly agency and contract principles. In the era given its 
name by Lochner v. New York,26 freedom of contract reigned supreme. 
The Due Process Clause of the Constitution, according to Supreme 
Court decisions of the time, trumped almost any effort to regulate 
employment, including minimum wage and child labor laws.27 Lochner 
 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/workplace/workplace.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2003). 
 22. Id. §§ I.2-3, I.6, I.15-16. 
 23. Id. §§ I.5, I.13, I.17, III.5. 
 24. Id. § IV. 
 25. Id. § V.1. 
 26. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 27. See Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923), overruled by W. Coast 
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itself struck down New York state legislation limiting daily employment 
to ten hours and weekly employment to 60 hours.28 At the same time, 
employers sought so-called labor injunctions to break up strikes and 
punish collective action.29 All of this changed, of course, in the 1930s. 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act30—in conjunction with state-level “little 
Norris-LaGuardia Acts”—largely eliminated labor injunctions and 
outlawed “yellow dog contracts.”31 The National Labor Relations Act 
established a framework for collective bargaining between workers and 
management. And with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,32 the Supreme 
Court reversed course and permitted state regulation of wages, hours, 
and working conditions.33 
Thereafter the law of the employment relationship, and particularly 
its study, has centered not around the common law but instead around 
the many statutes which regulate some aspect of that relationship. As 
noted earlier, legal academia has divided those statutes into two rough 
categories: labor law and employment law. Labor law provisions govern 
the collective-bargaining relationship between employers and their 
employees’ representatives.34 Employment law provisions regulate the 
individual employment contract, usually by requiring or prohibiting 
certain terms of employment.35 Employment law provisions are 
sometimes referred to as entitlements or minimum terms, since they 
require a minimum level of wages, safety precautions, and the like. 
Labor law, on the other hand, does not generally require a minimum 
level of benefits. Instead, the parties are free to agree to whatever they 
want, as long as the rules of the game are followed. 
Both federal and state statutes set the ground rules in the 
employment law arena. The relationship between the federal and state 
regimes, however, falls into roughly three categories. In the first 
 
Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 28. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64–65. 
 29. See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930). A 
well-known version of such an injunction is the subject matter of Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 
1077, 1077–78 (1896). For a contrary view of the legitimacy of such injunctions, see Sylvester 
Petro, Injunctions and Labor Disputes: 1880-1932, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 346 (1978). 
 30. Norris LaGuardia (Anti-Injunction) Act of 1932, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115 (2000). 
 31. See WALTER E. OBERER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIAL ON LABOR LAW: COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING IN A FREE SOCIETY 78–80 (5th ed. 2002). 
 32. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 33. Id. at 386–87, 388, 400. 
 34. As one labor law text puts it, labor law is “the legal framework governing the organization 
of workers and the process of collective bargaining . . . .” HARPER ET AL., supra note 9, at 1. 
 35. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES & MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION & EMPLOYMENT LAW 1, 936 (2000). 
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category, federal law sets the standard, and state law either mirrors that 
standard or provides background support. For example, the federal Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) provides for a minimum wage for all 
employees and overtime pay for certain types of employees.36 In New 
York, state law mirrors those requirements; New York requires the same 
minimum wage,37 as well as overtime for the same types of employees.38 
The FLSA encourages state regulation of wages and hours through its 
saving clause, which permits states to require a higher minimum wage or 
shorter maximum workweek than the FLSA.39 Courts have differed as to 
whether the saving clause permits states to provide greater remedies for 
wage and hour violations than those provided by the FLSA.40 
Regardless, the FLSA does countenance some role for state and local 
regulation in its regulatory scheme. 
In the second category, federal law not only sets the standard but 
also occupies the field. For example, the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) regulates employee pension and welfare benefit 
plans. Section 514 of ERISA provides that the statute “shall supersede 
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any 
employee benefit plan.”41 Both the Supreme Court and academic 
commentators have noted the broad scope of this language.42 ERISA 
preemption has made it quite difficult for states to regulate in the area of 
 
 36. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (2000). 
 37. See N.Y. LABOR LAW § 652(1) (McKinney 2002). Currently, the rate is set at $5.15 per 
hour. 
 38. See 12 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, § 142-2.2 (2001). The provision is derived 
directly from federal law. It states: “An employer shall pay an employee for overtime at a wage rate 
of 1 ½ times the employee’s regular rate in the manner and methods provided in and subject to the 
exemptions of sections 7 and 13 of 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as 
amended.” Id. 
 39. 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (2000) (“No provision of this chapter . . . shall excuse noncompliance 
with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the 
minimum wage established under this chapter or a maximum work week lower than the maximum 
workweek established under this chapter . . . .”). 
 40. Compare Divine v. Levy, 36 F. Supp. 55, 58 (W.D. La. 1940) (holding that state remedies 
cannot exceed FLSA remedies) with Spieth v. Adasen Distrib., Inc., No. 88-1541, 1989 WL 61187, 
at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24, 1989) (holding that the saving clause allows for greater remedies). For a 
discussion of this issue, see Michael D. Moberly, Fair Labor Standards Act Preemption of State 
Wage Payment Remedies, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 991 (1991). 
 41. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). 
 42. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1987) (“[P]reemption 
provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive. . . .”); JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, 
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 496 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that § 514 has “language of 
remarkable breadth”); Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA 
Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 36 (1996) 
(stating that ERISA “broadly preempts state laws that ‘relate to’ employee benefit plans”). 
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pensions or health care. Although recent legislation has created some 
room for states to maneuver,43 ERISA still dictates most of the 
regulation in these areas.44 
Finally, in the third category, state law sets the standards, and 
federal law is either absent or plays a supporting role. Workers’ 
compensation provisions, for example, are entirely the domain of state 
law. Federal law only plays a minor role: the Americans with 
Disabilities Act45 and the Family and Medical Leave Act46 both provide 
additional protections for injured or disabled workers, but these benefits 
complement those provided by workers’ compensation. The federal 
government has a more complex relationship with unemployment 
insurance, but here, too, the state has the primary role in establishing the 
type of aid available and in providing the actual benefits.47 
In contrast, in the realm of state labor law there is really only one 
regime of state-federal relations. The NLRA is the federal statute that 
establishes the framework for collective bargaining.48 Although the 
NLRA has no express preemption provision, the Act has been 
interpreted to have broad preemption effects on state and local activity.49 
Under the line of cases beginning with San Diego Building Trades 
Council v. Garmon, states are forbidden from regulating activities that 
are actually or arguably protected activity or prohibited activity under 
the Act.50 Federal preemption was then extended to conduct not 
explicitly regulated by the NLRA in Machinists v. Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Commission.51 Under the Machinists doctrine, 
states may not regulate collective bargaining activities not specifically 
protected or prohibited by the Act if, in the eyes of the court, Congress 
 
 43. See Colleen E. Medill, HIPAA and Its Related Legislation: A New Role for ERISA in the 
Regulation of Private Health Care Plans?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 485, 502–04 (1998) (explaining how 
HIPAA changed ERISA preemption to allow for state regulation of certain aspects of health care 
plans). 
 44. ERISA preemption has even been seen to extend to such areas as the regulation of 
employee discharge. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138–40 (1990) (holding 
that ERISA preempted a Texas common-law wrongful discharge action alleging that an employer 
terminated an employee to avoid making pension fund contributions). 
 45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000). 
 46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000). 
 47. See Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Distribution, 49 UCLA L. REV. 
335, 340, 344–45 (2001). 
 48. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241 (1959). 
 49. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders & Contractors 
of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 224–26 (1993) (describing the standard under which preemption 
questions are to be considered). 
 50. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245. 
 51. 427 U.S. 132 (1976). 
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intended for these activities to remain unregulated.52 Together, these two 
doctrines have rendered the whole spectrum of collective-bargaining 
activity largely untouchable to anyone but the federal government.53 
Only spheres of traditional state interests, such as regulating violent 
crimes (at picket sites) or protecting property interests (of employers), 
are available to state law-making.54 
Certainly, the preemption doctrines have not entirely removed 
states from the realm of collective-bargaining. States are free to regulate 
the collective bargaining process for employees not covered by the 
NLRA, such as agricultural workers and state government employees.55 
Under the Machinists doctrine, states are also permitted to participate in 
the collective bargaining process as market participants; for example, a 
state can require subcontractors to agree to a labor agreement in 
soliciting bids for a construction project.56 However, states are 
prohibited from using such market power to “regulate” labor relations; 
for example, states cannot bar employers who have repeat NLRA 
violations from doing business with the state.57 When dealing with 
private employers in a purely regulatory context, states are left working 
around the edges of the Garmon and Machinists doctrines. Preemption 
doctrine has struck down state efforts to penalize the use of permanent 
striker replacements58 and to limit the scope of trespass laws in labor 
disputes.59 And the scope of the doctrine continues to develop. Last year 
New York enacted legislation prohibiting the use of state funds or 
property to assist, promote, or deter union organizing.60 However, a 
federal district court recently found similar legislation in California to be 
preempted.61 
 
 52. Id. at 149. 
 53. See Estlund, supra note 1, at 1572–74. 
 54. See id. at 1573–74. 
 55. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 507 U.S. at 226. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 287 (1986). 
 58. See, e.g., Midwest Motor Express, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 120, 512 N.W.2d 
881, 883, 889 (Minn. 1994); Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 778 F. Supp. 
95, 98 (D. Mass. 1991). 
 59. See Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353, 363–66 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 60. 2002 N.Y. Laws 601 (codified at N.Y. LABOR LAW § 211-a (McKinney 2003)). 
 61. Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1205–06 (C.D Cal. 2002) 
(discussing Cal. Assembly Bill 1889 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § 16645 (West 2000))). The 
Lockyer appeal is now before the Ninth Circuit. The NLRB has granted its General Counsel 
permission to argue that the law is preempted. See Press Release, NLRB, Office of Gen. Counsel, 
Labor Board Authorizes Its General Counsel To Proceed On His Recommendation To Take 
Position In Ninth Circuit Case That Two Provisions Of California Statute Are Preempted By 
NLRA, NLRB Release No. 2493 (May 29, 2003), at http://www.nlrb.gov/press/r2493.html (last 
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Although states have some power to favor labor law adherents 
when making their own contracts, overall they are largely limited to 
following the NLRA’s lead when it comes to making labor law. Unlike 
many areas of employment law, labor law has been largely insulated 
from state innovation.62 
II. THE GREENGROCER CODE OF CONDUCT 
A. Background 
The greengrocery is a big-city, if not solely a New York City, 
institution. Greengroceries are small retail food stores that offer a 
selection of staples at convenient locations for extended hours.63 The 
name refers to the produce that is offered at these markets, which 
distinguish them from their suburban convenience-store counterparts.64 
In addition, an increasing number of greengroceries offer extensive salad 
bars with both hot and cold foods, in addition to their traditional fare.65 
Most stores employ between five and fifteen workers for such tasks as 
stocking the shelves and managing the produce.66 Unlike larger chain 
grocery stores and supermarkets, greengroceries are not owned en 
masse; instead, many greengroceries are individually owned.67 A large 
proportion of greengrocery owners are of Korean descent, while the 
workforce is largely of Mexican descent.68 There are approximately 
2,000 greengroceries in New York City.69 
 
visited Dec. 23, 2003). 
 62. See Estlund, supra note 1, at 1579. 
 63. See Interview with Patricia Smith, Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Labor 
Bureau (August 7, 2003) (forthcoming in 6 REGIONAL LABOR REPORTER (2004)) [hereinafter Smith 
Interview]. 
 64. Id. 
 65. The Greengrocer Code of Conduct defines greengroceries as “[t]he employers of retail 
food stores of 15,000 square feet or less.” Green Grocer Code of Conduct, supra note 21, at 1. Most 
greengroceries, however, are significantly smaller than 15,000 square feet. See Smith Interview, 
supra note 63. 
 66. See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer Sues 
Greengroceries for Labor Abuses (May 2, 2001) (last visited Dec. 23, 2003)[hereinafter May 2001 
Press Release]. 
 67. Smith Interview, supra note 63. Greengroceries are generally structured as being owned 
and operated by a corporation. Id. 
 68. See Steven Greenhouse, Korean Grocers Agree to Double Pay And Improve Workplace 
Conditions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at B1; Smith Interview, supra note 63. 
 69. See Greenhouse, supra note 68, at B1. 
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In 1999 evidence of potential employment law violations by local 
greengroceries came to the attention of the Labor Bureau of the New 
York State Attorney General’s Office.70 Workers were referred to the 
Bureau by the Community Labor Coalition of the Lower East Side and 
by Local 169 of UNITE.71 The Bureau learned from these workers that 
they were being paid between $180 and $360 for a workweek of 72 
hours—twelve hours a day for six days a week.72 In other words, the 
workers were getting between $2.50 and $5.00 an hour, with no 
overtime. These wages were a clear violation of federal and state laws 
regarding the minimum wage ($5.15 an hour), as well as overtime (time-
and-a-half for all hours worked over forty).73 
As its investigation grew, the Labor Bureau learned that these 
violations were not confined to one or two stores; instead, sublegal 
wages appeared endemic to the industry.74 Other workers slowly began 
to come forward. The Attorney General’s Office first pursued these 
cases through the traditional investigate-and-settle method.75 Since 
wage-related employment laws require that specific minimum terms be 
met, the violation is easy to prove with the right evidence.76 The remedy 
is also straightforward: the employer must pay the worker the back 
wages necessary to meet the legal minimums. Thus, if the evidence 
leaves little question about the nature and extent of the violations for 
each worker, the parties are likely to reach a settlement at something 
close to the full amount of the violation. These sums are paid to the 
individual workers at each location. 
 
 70. The Labor Bureau began its life as the representative of the Workers Compensation Board 
in judicial proceedings. The Bureau still spends a significant amount of its time as counsel to state 
employment law agencies, but it is also free to pursue violations of state law independently. Smith 
Interview, supra note 63. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, 
Greengrocers Settle Labor Abuse Charges (August 30, 2000), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2000/aug/aug30a_00.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2003); see also 
Smith Interview, supra note 63 (stating that employees had been paid between $200 and $300 for a 
72-hour workweek). 
 73. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (2000) (FLSA provision); N.Y. Labor Law § 652(1) 
(McKinney 2002) (New York State provision). The minimum wage for 72 hours of work (including 
overtime) is $453.20. 
 74. Smith Interview, supra note 63 (stating that the investigation that began on the Lower 
East Side of Manhattan continued throughout the city and a pattern of labor violation in the stores 
became evident). 
 75. Id. (explaining how the Labor Bureau would gather all the evidence before negotiating 
and provided incentives for the employers to settle). 
 76. Id. (discussing that procuring settlements was not a problem because evidence of the 
violations was readily apparent). 
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However, proceeding in the traditional manner can also be 
problematic. If the employer did not keep records of wages paid, then 
workers must come forward to testify about their wages and hours. 
Often, low-paid workers are afraid to report violations for fear of losing 
their jobs. In the case of the greengroceries, some of the Mexican 
workforce may also lack the proper authorization to work in this country 
legally.77 The potential for deportation lurks in the background for those 
undocumented workers who decide to make a public complaint. Even 
under the best scenario, in which workers come forward with written 
proof or clear recollections of the times, dates, and amounts of their 
wages, the process of collecting and presenting this evidence can be 
quite slow.78 
The Labor Bureau achieved individual settlements with ten to 
twenty greengroceries between 2000 and 2002.79 These settlements 
ranged from $30,000 to $105,000 in back pay per store, with between 
four to seventeen employees per store receiving money.80 These 
settlements sent a shockwave through the city’s greengrocers.81 
Although only a handful of greengroceries had been charged with 
violations, Attorney General Eliot Spitzer vowed to push for wage 
compliance throughout the industry.82 The grocers were also feeling 
embattled on other fronts: employees were beginning to organize at a 
few stores, and unions and community groups were targeting the 
greengroceries for public demonstrations.83 Despite public protests, 
several of the stores targeted by the Bureau continued to pay illegal 
wages.84 
 
 77. The Attorney General did not investigate whether the greengrocer workers had 
authorization under federal law to work in the United States. As Ms. Smith noted, the issue is 
irrelevant, since the wage and hour laws apply to undocumented as well as documented workers. 
See Smith Interview, supra note 63. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.; Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer, Spitzer and 
Consul General Announce Settlement of Labor Abuse Cases Against Greengroceries (November 
20, 2001), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2001/nov/nov20a_01.html (last visited Dec. 23, 
2003) [hereinafter November 2001 Press Release]; Press Release, Office of New York State 
Attorney General Elliot Spitzer, Spitzer Continues Efforts to Combat Wage Abuses in 
Greengroceries (December 13, 2001), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2001/dec/dec13d_01.html 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2003) [hereinafter December 2001 Press Release]. 
 81. See Greenhouse, supra note 68, at B1. 
 82. See May 2001 Press Release, supra note 66. 
 83. See Greenhouse, supra note 68, at B1. 
 84. See November 2001 Press Release, supra note 80. 
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As a result of the public and legal pressure mounted against them, 
greengrocers began to negotiate with the Labor Bureau to find a more 
stable solution.85 The Korean American Association of Greater New 
York (KAAGNY) was enlisted to serve as a representative of the 
greengrocers.86 The KAAGNY argued that greengrocers were unaware 
of the law’s requirements; many were recent immigrants who were not 
familiar with the wage and hour laws.87 Thus, as a first step, over 270 
greengrocers participated in employment law seminars conducted by the 
Attorney General’s Office.88 The Bureau, however, wanted to take a 
more concrete step to bring greengrocers into compliance. The 
traditional method of targeting and then settling with individual 
greengroceries would take too much time and too many attorneys.89 
Instead of taking each greengrocery separately, the Bureau decided to 
pursue a more comprehensive approach.90 Representatives from Casa 
Mexico, a non-profit organization representing Mexican workers, and 
the New York state AFL-CIO were brought into negotiations with the 
Bureau and the KAAGNY to achieve a forward-looking agreement.91 
After months of negotiations, the sides agreed to the Greengrocer Code 
of Conduct in September 2002.92 
B. The Greengrocer Code Requirements 
1. Terms of Employment 
The Greengrocer Code of Conduct may appear, at first, to be a 
streamlined version of the traditional employment law settlement 
agreement. One of the stated goals of the Code is to “increase labor law 
compliance by the undersigned employers,”93 and many of the Code’s 
terms are simply state law requirements. The Code’s obligations include 
paying employees the minimum wage,94 paying overtime,95 providing at 
 
 85. See Smith Interview, supra note 63. 
 86. See id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. The Labor Bureau only has eight attorneys. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Greengrocer Code of Conduct, supra note 21, introductory cmt. 
 94. Id. § I.2. The New York state minimum wage is the same as the federal minimum wage. 
See N.Y. LABOR LAW § 652 (McKinney 2002). 
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least one full (unpaid) day of rest each week,96 and providing meal 
breaks.97 The Code requires the greengrocers to pay their employees 
every week,98 maintain payroll and time records on the premises,99 and 
furnish payroll stubs to employees.100 In addition, the greengrocers must 
post a notice concerning these obligations in English, Spanish, and 
Korean.101 The Code also includes a catch-all provision, requiring the 
signatories to comply with certain articles of New York state labor and 
employment laws.102 
The Code goes beyond the minimum terms, however, with two 
important provisions. First, greengrocers are to provide at least one 
workweek of paid vacation to each employee who has worked at the 
store for at least one year.103 Second, employees are entitled to paid sick 
days: two days of sick leave if they have worked at the store for at least 
one year, and three days of sick leave if they have worked at the store for 
at least two years.104 The Code also notes that these requirements are 
minimums, not maximums, and states that the undersigned “recognize 
that it is good business practice to motivate employees with increases” in 
vacation and sick leave.105 Similar language can be found in the Code 
 
 95. Greengrocer Code of Conduct, supra note 21, § I.3. New York state requires time-and-a-
half for overtime, just like the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 
12 § 142-2.2 (2001). 
 96. Greengrocer Code of Conduct, supra note 21, § I.6. See N.Y. LABOR LAW § 161 
(McKinney 2002). 
 97. Greengrocer Code of Conduct, supra note 21, § I.7. New York law requires that 
employees receive one-half hour of (unpaid) time for a meal break during the work-day. Workers 
who begin before 11 a.m. and continue working past 7:00 p.m. are entitled to an additional twenty 
minute break; workers who work for at least six hours starting after 1 p.m. are entitled to a forty-
five minute break. See N.Y. LABOR LAW § 162 (McKinney 2002). 
 98. Greengrocer Code of Conduct, supra note 21, § I.4. See also N.Y. LABOR LAW § 191 
(McKinney 2002). 
 99. Greengrocer Code of Conduct, supra note 21, § I.5. See also N.Y. LABOR LAW § 661 
(McKinney 2002); N.Y. COMP. CODE R. & REGS. tit. 12, § 142-2.6 (2001). 
 100. Greengrocer Code of Conduct, supra note 21, § I.9. See also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 12 § 142-2.7 (2001). 
 101. Greengrocer Code of Conduct, supra note 21, § I.8. See also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 12 § 142-2.8 (2001). 
 102. Greengrocer Code of Conduct, supra note 21, § I.11. The enumerated New York Labor 
Law Articles are Articles 4 (regarding employment of minors); 5 (hours of labor); 6 (payment of 
wages); 7 (general provisions); 19 (minimum wage); 20-A (labor and management improper 
practices act); 20-C (retaliatory action by employers); and 28 (toxic substances). 
 103. Id. § I.16. 
 104. Id. § I.15. In terms of notice, employees must obtain employer approval at least two 
weeks before taking vacation, and must notify the employer “as soon as possible” regarding a sick 
day. 
 105. Id. §§ I.15, I.16. 
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regarding increases to the minimum wage and break times.106 
2. Educational Provisions 
Greengrocers who sign the Code are required to attend a two-hour 
educational training session about basic wage, recordkeeping, and safety 
and health requirements under New York Law.107 The sessions are 
conducted by the Attorney General’s office in both English and 
Korean.108 In addition, the greengrocers are to allow their employees to 
attend a two-hour educational session covering similar topics, conducted 
by the Attorney General and community organizations.109 The 
greengrocers are to post notices about the time and location of these 
sessions; they are also encouraged (but not required) to pay their 
employees for time spent at these sessions.110 
In terms of the Code itself, the signatories are to inform their 
employees orally that they have signed on to the Code.111 They must also 
provide employees with a written summary of the Code in the 
employee’s native language and post a summary on the wall in a 
conspicuous location.112 
3. Monitoring Process 
One of the most important facets of the Code of Conduct is the 
monitoring process outlined in its provisions. Each signatory agrees to 
submit to unannounced monitoring by an independent company selected 
by the Attorney General’s Office.113 The purpose of the monitoring is to 
insure compliance with the Code’s provisions, primarily the minimum 
wage and overtime requirements. The monitor is to have access to all 
payroll and time records, and shall be able to talk to employees privately 
 
 106. Id. §§ I.2, I.7. 
 107. Id. § I.17. 
 108. Smith Interview, supra note 63. 
 109. Greengrocer Code of Conduct, supra note 21, § I.18. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. § I.14. 
 112. Id. § I.13. These summaries are available at the Attorney General’s website. See Summary 
of Greengrocer Code of Conduct (English), at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/workplace/final_ggcode_english_short.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2003); 
Summary of Greengrocer Code of Conduct (Spanish), at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/workplace/final_ggcode_spanish_short.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2003); 
Summary of Greengrocer Code of Conduct (Korean), at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/workplace/final_ggcode_korean_short.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2003). 
 113. Greengrocer Code of Conduct, supra note 21, § III.1. 
BODIE ARTICLE - FINAL FORMAT- HLELJ 10/28/2004 3:53:34 PM 
2003] The New York Greengrocer Code of Conduct 195 
for up to fifteen minutes.114 Once the visit has been completed, the 
monitor is to prepare a brief written report of any violations found.115 If 
violations are found, then the monitor is to conduct a follow-up visit 
three weeks later, submitting an additional report of any further 
violations found.116 
The monitor reports directly to the Attorney General’s Office.117 
However, the monitor is also to provide its reports to the Code of 
Conduct Committee. The Committee consists of three members: one 
greengrocer representative, one employee representative, and one 
Attorney General representative.118 The Committee reviews the 
monitor’s reports and is to prepare a brief annual report summarizing the 
monitor’s activities, including the total number of greengrocers visited 
and the violations that were found.119 In addition, the Committee can 
receive complaints about violations of the Code through a toll-free 
number.120 Upon receiving a complaint, the Committee is to determine 
whether reasonable cause of a violation exists. If such cause exists, the 
Committee is to notify the Attorney General’s Office, who will send the 
monitor to investigate.121 However, if there is a recognized employee 
collective bargaining representative at the particular worksite, the 
Committee must first notify that representative of the complaint.122 If the 
violation has not been corrected in ten days, the Committee is then to 
notify the Attorney General’s Office.123 
The Code takes steps to establish links between the monitor and 
greengrocer employees. In its first visit to stores with ten or more 
employees, the monitor will choose a “Code of Conduct employee 
contact person” after consultation with the store’s employees.124 
Employees are also assured of confidentiality when meeting with the 
monitor or when making complaints to the Committee.125 All monitor 
reporting and public documentation shall redact employee information 
 
 114. Id. § III.5. 
 115. Id. § III.8. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. § III.2. 
 118. Id. The Code does not specify how these representatives are to be chosen, although the 
code specifies that actual greengrocer owners or employees cannot serve on the Committee. Id. § 
III.2(a). 
 119. Id. § VI.1. These reports are to be made available to the public. Id. § VI.2. 
 120. Id. § III.3. The telephone number is 1-800-729-1180. 
 121. Id. § III.3(a). 
 122. Id. § III.3(b). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. § III.6. 
 125. Id. § III.7. 
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unless the worker provides express written consent.126 
4. Retaliation Protection 
The Code requires that employers not discharge, penalize, or in any 
other way retaliate against employees for making complaints about 
potential violations of the Code.127 The Code also notes that state and 
federal law prohibits employers from retaliating or discriminating 
against employees for exercising their right to organize.128 
5. Non-Binding “Recognitions” 
In addition to its required terms, the Code also sets forth a number 
of aspirational provisions framed as “recognitions” by the employer.129 
As noted earlier, the Code only requires the payment of the minimum 
wage. At the same time, however, the Code states that “the undersigned 
employers recognize that it is a good business practice to motivate 
employees with regular wage increases.”130 The Code also states that its 
employers recognize that paying for time used for meal breaks is a good 
business practice that helps “build[] employee morale.”131 Other such 
“good business practices” include motivating employees with additional 
sick and vacation days, and not discharging an employee unless there is 
a reason related to job performance.132 The Code also mentions the 
procedures available through the State Employment Relations Board for 
the resolution of collective bargaining issues.133 These procedures, 
which include majority authorization agreements and mediation, are 
encouraged by the Code.134 The Code also encourages employers to 
provide their employees of Mexican descent with an unpaid holiday on 
December 12.135 The Code asks that employers attempt to grant this 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. § I.10. 
 128. Id. § II.1. 
 129. See id. § II. In the international law context, aspirational but unenforceable treaty 
provisions are referred to as “soft law,” since there are no specified “hard” consequences to 
disobeying such provisions. For a discussion of “soft law,” see Gunther F. Handl et al., A Hard 
Look at Soft Law, 82 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 371 (1988). 
 130. Greengrocer Code of Conduct, supra note 21, § I.2. 
 131. Id. § I.7. 
 132. Id. § II.3. The provision also recognizes, however, that employers “have the right to 
discipline or discharge employees who are not performing adequately.” 
 133. Id. § II.1. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. § II.4. December 12th is the Catholic feast day of Our Lady of Guadalupe, the patron 
BODIE ARTICLE - FINAL FORMAT- HLELJ 10/28/2004 3:53:34 PM 
2003] The New York Greengrocer Code of Conduct 197 
request “as much as is feasible with a minimum of disruption to the 
store’s daily activities.”136 
6. Forbearance for Prior Violations 
As part of the Code of Conduct, the Attorney General agrees to 
refrain from investigating signatories for prior civil violations of the 
state minimum wage and overtime laws.137 Along with agreeing to the 
Code and maintaining good standing under it, greengrocers must also 
execute an Assurance of Discontinuance with the Attorney General’s 
Office.138 
7. Seal of Good Standing 
Signatories to the Code are to receive a Code of Conduct Seal, 
which can be displayed on the store’s window.139 The Attorney 
General’s website is also to maintain a list of greengrocers in good 
standing under the Code.140 
8. Expiration Date 
The Code has a two-year life span.141 Six months prior to expiration 
there is to be a meeting with the monitor, the Code of Conduct 
Committee, the Attorney General’s Office, and representatives of the 
greengrocers and their employees.142 The meeting’s purpose is to review 
the effectiveness of the Code and determine whether to renew the Code 
(with or without modifications) for another two years.143 
C. The First Year of the Code 
Thus far, the Code has been successful in implementing its goals. 
Greengrocers continue to sign on to the Code, even after the initial push 
 
saint of Mexico. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. § IV. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. § V.1. The Seal can be viewed at  
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/workplace/ggcode_seal.jpg. 
 140. Id. § V.2. 
 141. Id. § VII(a). 
 142. Id. § VII(c). 
 143. Id. 
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for enrollment ended in February 2003.144 The recently-hired monitor 
has begun to visit the member stores and has largely found compliance 
on the minimum wage and overtime requirements.145 None of the 
member stores have dropped out of the Code.146 If greengrocers continue 
to sign up and comply with the Code’s requirements, the Code will have 
succeeded in completely reshaping the employment landscape for 
hundreds of greengrocer workers. 
III. THE GREENGROCER CODE OF CONDUCT AS A 
MODEL FOR STATE LABOR LAW 
The Greengrocer Code of Conduct is surely an innovative method 
in attacking the problem of minimum wage and hour violations in the 
greengrocer industry. But is it really anything more than a series of 
dressed-up settlement agreements? Is it really a new form of state labor 
law? And if so, what promise does it hold for the future? These 
questions are addressed below. 
A. The Code as State Labor Law 
The impetus for the Greengrocer Code of Conduct was the 
widespread incidence of greengrocer employment law violations. The 
Attorney General’s Office began its investigation based on evidence that 
greengrocers were paying their employees less than the minimum wage, 
with no overtime. The core of the Code’s terms is basic compliance with 
state laws regarding the minimum wage, overtime, time-off, and record-
keeping. Greengrocers were induced to sign on to the Code, at least in 
part, by the Attorney General’s promise not to investigate past violations 
of signatories. Why, then, isn’t the Code just a clever version of an 
employment law settlement? 
The Code has several aspects which take it beyond an ordinary 
wage-and-hour settlement. In comparing the initial greengrocer 
 
 144. As of March 2003, there were 165 greengrocers who had signed on to the code. See 
Greengrocer Code of Conduct Signatories, at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/workplace/ggcode_store_listing.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2003). As of 
August 2003, there were about 200 signatories. See Smith Interview, supra note 63. 
 145. See Smith Interview, supra note 63. Interestingly, the Monitor (A & L Group, Inc.) has 
found several instances of stores failing to keep proper track of their employees’ time. In most of 
these stores, however, the problem was only one of record-keeping; employees were being fully 
paid for the time worked. See id. 
 146. One store went out of business after signing the Code, although a greengrocery remains at 
that location. See id. 
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settlements with the Code, the first major difference is scope. 
Settlements represent the closure of a particular case against a particular 
employer for particular violations of the law. The Code, on the other 
hand, requires no evidence of guilt on the prosecution’s part, and no 
admission of guilt on the employer’s part. Yes, the Code may in effect 
absolve greengrocers of potential liability for prior acts.147 But unlike a 
settlement, which is a specific resolution of a specific set of allegations, 
the Code only bars the Attorney General from investigating potential 
prior acts.148 This may, in effect, give employers a “free ride” out of 
liability. But it also gives the Attorney General’s Office a “free ride” out 
of the need to develop evidence about every single greengrocer for 
violations. The ability to proceed on an industry-wide basis, rather than 
an individual-employer basis, transforms the Code into more than just a 
settlement. It is instead a blueprint for employee relations for the entire 
sector. 
Second, the Code resembles a collective-bargaining agreement. The 
Code sets forth minimum requirements for employee terms and 
conditions of employment. The wage, overtime, time-off, and record-
keeping requirements are simply the legally-required minimums.149 
However, these terms are substantially better than the terms the 
employees had been given prior to the Code’s promulgation.150 
Moreover, the Code also requires that employees be given one week of 
vacation and two to three sick days.151 Instead of simply requiring 
redress for past violations and future compliance with the law, the Code 
establishes an industry-wide set of employment terms that go beyond the 
legal minimum. 
Third, most settlement agreements are enforced through a 
cumbersome, court-oriented compliance process. Once a case has been 
settled, the employer is often left to its own devices in carrying out the 
settlement agreement. Employees may endeavor to report violations of 
the agreement, but compliance can only be compelled through contempt 
proceedings or additional litigation. The Code, on the other hand, has set 
up an internal mechanism for handling and investigating employee 
complaints. As part of signing on to the Code, employers agree to allow 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. In other words, employees or even other government agencies could probably 
pursue the prior violations without worry of a collateral estoppel argument. 
 149. See supra Part II; see also Smith Interview, supra note 63. 
 150. As the New York Times headline noted, the Code “doubled” the pay of the greengrocer 
employees. See Greenhouse, supra note 68, at B1. 
 151. Greengrocer Code of Conduct, supra note 21, §§ I.15–16. 
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a monitor access to its employees and its records.152 The monitor is not 
an occasional spot-checker; it is required to investigate every signatory 
during the term of the Code.153 The monitor then reports to the Code 
Committee, which is set up to respond to questions or complaints about 
Code compliance.154 The Committee not only allows for joint discussion, 
investigation, and analysis; it also creates an institution through which 
future agreements can be hammered out.155 It thus shares similarities not 
only with a grievance arbitration system, but also with a multi-employer 
bargaining process. A settlement agreement is seen as an end to a 
particular litigation process. The Code establishes a future-oriented plan 
with built-in enforcement and amendment procedures. 
Even if the Code moves beyond the realm of a simple settlement 
agreement, why claim that it represents a new approach to state labor 
law, rather than employment law? After all, as discussed above, 
employment law is all about supplying particular minimum terms for 
employment agreements, and the Code supplies such terms. Admittedly, 
the Code does not look much like an archetypical labor law. The NLRA 
establishes a process; the Code establishes an outcome. The NLRB 
professes to be a neutral umpire on the sidelines; the Attorney General’s 
Office was intimately involved in the negotiating process and ultimately 
set the final terms. However, the Code is more than just a set of 
minimum terms to be applied. It establishes a collective relationship 
between greengrocers and their employees. It establishes a process for 
complaining about Code violations, and then remedying them. It 
provides for an independent monitor, accountable to the parties, to insure 
that the Code is being followed. In other words, it gives greengrocery 
employees a set of collective rights, and then provides an independent 
method for enforcing them. In many ways, it establishes a collective-
bargaining relationship between a multi-employer group and its 
employees. 
This type of collective-bargaining “regulation” is novel in the realm 
of labor law. Instead of taking a set of rules and applying them across 
industries, geographies, and economies, the Code takes a set of 
provisions and applies them to employers in one city, in one industry. 
Instead of standing back and waiting for employees to initiate a 
collective-bargaining relationship, the Attorney General’s Office stepped 
 
 152. Id. § III.1. 
 153. Id. § III.3. 
 154. Id. § III.3(b). 
 155. Id. § VII (c). 
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in and forced the two groups together. It is a tailored approach to the 
problems in one particular workplace milieu. Because it deals with 
employers and employees in a collective relationship, and creates in 
essence a government-sponsored collective bargaining agreement, it is 
more than just employment law—it is an interventionist form of labor 
law. 
Thus, the Code is an opportunity for rethinking our approach to 
labor law. Instead of relying on a single, national set of rules for all 
employers and employees to follow, states and localities could explore 
collective approaches to specific industries. Instead of creating a 
complex system of employer-employee interaction and then taking a 
step back, states and localities could participate in these interactions, as 
both mediators and advocates for particular terms and conditions. And 
instead of assuming that a settlement agreement is the end of the matter, 
states and localities could establish codes that ensure substantially 
independent policing while maintaining government oversight. Below 
are some thoughts about what such codes might need to succeed, and 
where they might be of most use. 
B. The Code as a Model for Future Action 
The Code seems to provide a unique way of establishing better 
working conditions for an entire industry’s employees. Is it a one-time 
phenomenon, or is it a model for a new approach to workplace 
regulation? It is probably premature to make any definitive predictions. 
But the following are some thoughts about when and how the Code 
might serve for future developments. 
1. Factors Needed for Future Codes 
In looking closely at the background, negotiations, and terms of the 
Code, one can identify several factors that would be necessary in 
developing codes in other industries. 
a. Widespread Employment Law Violations 
The primary purpose of the Code is to bring greengrocers into 
compliance with the existing employment law. Likewise, the primary 
incentive for greengrocers to join the Code is to escape liability for past 
employment law violations. If only a few greengrocers had been out of 
compliance, individual settlement agreements would have been 
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sufficient to resolve the lawlessness. If greengrocers had paid their 
workers poorly but within legal limits, there would have been no “hook” 
to bring them to the Code. 
b. A Core of Cooperating Employees 
Part of the genius of the Code is that it brings compliance to an 
entire industry without the need for massive amounts of evidence. 
However, some evidence of wrongdoing is necessary to get the ball 
rolling. If employees had not reported wage violations to the Attorney 
General’s office, and then been willing to testify about them, the 
Attorney General would have been unable to pursue the initial 
settlements that provided the concrete threat of further enforcement 
procedures. 
c. Similar Working Conditions Across the Industry 
The Code sets uniform terms and conditions for greengrocers 
across New York City. If employees had varying responsibilities or job 
titles, or if different neighborhoods had different wages and benefits, 
then greengrocers would have found it difficult to agree on standard 
terms for the entire industry. 
d. Willing and Able Negotiating Representatives 
Both the greengrocers and their employees were represented by 
ethnic organizations at the Code negotiations.156 The Korean-American 
Association appears to have been particularly crucial in representing the 
greengrocers during talks and then encouraging them to sign on once it 
was completed.157 If these ethnic groups had been unavailable, it is hard 
to imagine who might have been able to broker the Code. The 
greengrocers did not have an industry-wide organization or 
representation, and the employees largely were not represented by 
unions. Technically, employer representatives are more important than 
employee representatives, since it is employers who sign on to the Code. 
But employee representatives ensure that workers have a voice in the 
process and serve to garner public support after the Code is complete.158 
 
 156. See Smith Interview, supra note 63. 
 157. See id.; see also Greenhouse, supra note 68, at B1. 
 158. Much more could be written on the legitimacy and accountability of the representatives 
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e. Consumer support. 
Public pressure played an important role in convincing employers 
to sign on to the Code.159 Demonstrations against the stores certainly 
took a toll in an industry that needs consumer support. The inclusion of 
the good standing seal demonstrates that greengrocers saw a benefit to 
improving their public standing. Because the sheer number of 
greengrocers, as well as their separate ownership, enables consumers to 
choose another grocery fairly easily, the grocers had an incentive not to 
stand out as bad actors. 
f. Government Action 
The Attorney General’s interest in the case was necessary in 
brokering the deal. The Attorney General’s Office not only investigated 
the violations and pursued legal action, it also originated the notion of 
the Code, negotiated its terms, and then provided the administration and 
funding for its operation. The Code could, of course, have been 
developed and promulgated by greengrocers themselves. In fact, many 
industries have developed private codes or policies of self-regulation in 
response to consumer concern or the threat of governmental 
regulation.160 However, it is doubtful that many of the greengrocers 
would have been interested in the Code absent the imminent threat of 
legal sanction.161 Moreover, the Attorney General’s involvement 
provided more accountability to the ultimate result. A code developed 
solely by industry players would not have had the legitimacy of the 
Greengrocer Code. The Attorney General was able to represent both the 
workers and the public, to some extent, in its ultimate approval of the 
 
chosen to negotiate the Code. In the context of the Greengrocer negotiations, the representatives 
appear to have had the support of their constituent members. Although the employer representatives 
were unelected and thus arguably not accountable, the actual decision to sign on to the Code was 
left up to the individual greengrocer. A stronger argument could be made that, in theory, the 
employee representatives were unaccountable and thus illegitimate. After all, the employees’ actual 
collective bargaining representatives (for those few employees with collective representation) were 
left out of the room during negotiations. Again, however, employees at individual stores were left 
free to bargain through a collective representative for a better deal than the Code offered. 
 159. See Greenhouse, supra note 68, at B6 (“For many grocers, improving their relations with 
the public and with employees is central to their backing the code.”). 
 160. For a discussion of industry self-regulation at the international level, see VIRGINIA 
HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR (2001). 
 161. Imminent, of course, being a key concept: violations may exist for years without any legal 
action being taken by employment agencies or private citizens. 
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Code.162 
2. Scenarios for future Codes 
Based on these factors, several industries appear to be possible 
candidates for a Code of Conduct. The following is a brief sketch of 
these possibilities. 
a. New York Laundry Business 
The New York Attorney General’s Office has begun investigations 
into employment law violations by small New York City laundry 
operators.163 These businesses share many characteristics with 
greengrocers: they are small, often with family and immigrant 
ownership, have small profit margins, and rely on an unskilled 
immigrant workforce.164 They would also seem to put stock in their 
public reputation. At this moment it is unclear whether there are 
widespread violations in the industry.165 Moreover, there may not be any 
ethnic or industry group which could represent the operators in 
negotiations over a code.166 But a Code setting forth terms across the 
industry might successfully serve to bring operators into compliance, 
while at the same time ensuring that complying firms are not put at a 
competitive disadvantage. 
b. New York Restaurants 
The Attorney General’s Office has had a few cases involving 
minimum wage and hour violations by restaurants, particularly with 
regard to kitchen workers.167 Such workers are also frequently unskilled 
immigrant workers, making it easier for restaurants to subject them to 
sub-legal conditions. Restaurants would certainly be subject to public 
 
 162. In the international context, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may be able to 
assume some of the responsibilities borne by the Attorney General in the greengrocer negotiations. 
For further discussion of the power of NGOs to effect industry codes of conduct, see Peter J. Spiro, 
Accounting for NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 161, 168–69 (2002), and Peter J. Spiro, New Global 
Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the “Unregulated” Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 957 (1996). 
 163. Smith Interview, supra note 63. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See id. 
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pressure, as New York consumers are able to choose from a wide variety 
of restaurants. Thus far, however, it is unclear whether abuses are 
uniform across the industry, and it would be difficult to find 
representatives for the myriad restaurateurs in New York. 
c. Produce Providers 
Exploitation of agricultural workers has been endemic to our 
economy for generations.168 Recent reports that immigrant workers in 
Florida tomato and citrus groves are paid sub-legal wages, threatened 
with violence, and detained against their will demonstrate that something 
akin to slavery may be taking place in the United States.169 The actual 
employers who engage in these practices are far down on the food chain, 
but they are vital links in the chain that supplies such multi-national 
brands as Tropicana and Taco Bell.170 These companies can plausibly 
(or, at least thus far, legally) distance themselves from the horrendous 
violations at the ground level. A Code of Conduct for produce providers 
would create a new method of providing accountability. The Code 
would instantly signal that a particular provider was in compliance with 
the law. Such compliance would be much more likely with a rigorous 
system of monitoring. And, unlike the Greengrocer Code, it may be 
possible to secure funding for the monitor from the industry itself. If, for 
example, Tropicana and Taco Bell were paying for monitors to insure 
that their produce was obtained through legal means, costly federal and 
state investigations would not be needed. With a rigorous initial effort 
from state or federal authorities, a code could be put into place that 
might finally crack the stubborn cycle of agricultural employee abuse. 
CONCLUSION 
The Greengrocer Code of Conduct is barely a year old. It is too 
soon to know whether this innovative agreement will successfully 
transition New York greengroceries from illegal working conditions to a 
legal and interactive employment relationship.171 However, I hope this 
discussion prompts further consideration of the Code’s progress, as well 
as thoughts about potential application of the Code’s model to other 
 
 168. See, e.g., JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (1939). 
 169. John Bowe, Nobodies, THE NEW YORKER, April 21 & 28, 2003, at 106. 
 170. See id. at 122–24. 
 171. One important question is whether the Code has affected workers at the large majority of 
greengrocers who have not signed on to the Code. 
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industries. It may prove a real chance for states once again to participate 
in the creation and application of labor law. And this participation may 
be the best chance to escape from our current state of labor law stasis. 
